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 Social Knowledge and Social Norms 
 Peter J. Graham 
 1.  Introduction 
 Many philosophers in the twentieth century argued that knowledge was social, 
for belief was social, for thought was impossible without language. A  weaker 
view was also popular:  although perhaps thought does not depend on other 
minds, knowledge does, for knowledge requires the ability to justify one’s belief 
to others according to social standards of justifi ed belief. By the end of the 
twentieth century, however, both views fell on hard times. Th e current wisdom 
holds that neither belief nor knowledge is essentially social. 
 Nevertheless, a good deal (if not most) of what we know we know because 
we believe what other people tell us. Th e extent of our knowledge owes a great 
deal to what we learn from others. Epistemology would be far from complete if 
it did not thoroughly address testimony. Although discussed during the Modern 
Period, it was not until the late twentieth century that testimony came to the 
fore. 1 In this chapter I focus on testimony as a central source of knowledge. 2 
 2.  Justifi cation versus knowledge (the anti- luck condition) 
 I begin with the distinction between justifi cation and the anti- Gettier or ‘anti- 
luck’ condition on propositional knowledge. I  will rely on this distinction to 
frame our discussion. 
 On the traditional analysis of propositional knowledge, a subject’s knowledge 
that P is comprised of (1) S’s belief that P, (2) the fact that P (so that S’s belief 
that P is true), and (3)  S’s having a justifi cation for believing that P.  Gettier 
( 1963 ) showed that there are cases of justifi ed true belief that P that fall short 
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of knowledge. Here is an example from Bertrand Russell ( 1948 ): an individual 
may look at a clock and as a result truly believe, with justifi cation, that the time 
is 2 p.m. But what if the clock is stopped and the individual only looked at just 
the ‘right’ time? Th en the individual does not know it is 2 p.m. (despite having 
a justifi ed true belief): you can’t learn the time by looking at a stopped clock. 
Th e ‘Gettier problem’ led most epistemologists to conclude that propositional 
knowledge includes an additional ‘anti- luck’ condition. 3 Let’s then assume that 
justifi cation is one thing and the anti- luck condition is another, for you can meet 
one without meeting the other. 
 3.  What is testimony? 
 Th is is a question not about the speech act per se – namely, what is testimony 
as one speech act among others?  – but rather about the  process that leads to 
so- called testimony- based beliefs. Th e question ‘What is testimony?’ (for our 
purposes) is the question ‘What makes a belief a testimony- based belief?’ 
Testimonial knowledge is then testimony- based belief that meets the conditions 
for knowledge:  testimonial knowledge is justifi ed true testimony- based belief 
that satisfi es the fourth, anti- luck condition, just as perceptual knowledge is 
justifi ed true perceptual- belief that satisfi ed the fourth, anti- luck condition. 
 Here are three easy examples of testimony- based belief. You want to know the 
time, so you ask a passer- by. ‘2 p.m.’ she says. You believe her. You want to know 
the best time to visit Shanghai, so you do a web search. Th e top hits tell you that 
the second week of October has the best weather and the fewest tourists. You 
decide that you want to know a little chemistry, so you buy a textbook. When 
you read about the elements, you form a series of testimony- based beliefs. 
 Th ese examples have the following three ingredients in common. 
  (1)  Someone’s testimony that P is the  distal cause . A belief is testimony- 
based because it is causally based or sustained (in part) on someone else’s 
testimony, where ‘someone’s testimony that P’ includes assertions, sayings, 
tellings, even assertive conversational implicatures. 
  (2)  A hearer’s representation as of a speaker’s testimony that P is (part of) 
the  proximal cause . Th e hearer must represent the speaker’s speech act 
 as a telling or saying that P – the hearer must comprehend the speaker’s 
testimony as a part of the process of forming a testimony- based belief. 
No comprehension  as of a speaker asserting that P as a normal part of the 
formation of a testimony- based belief, no testimony- based belief that P. 
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  (3)  Th e psychological transition from comprehension to belief involves 
 deference or  epistemic dependence to the epistemic authority of the speaker. 
Th e hearer is ‘turning to’ the speaker (to the passer- by, to informants on 
the internet, to chemistry as a science) for information (for knowledge), 
and deferring to, or depending upon, the speaker (the sender) for the 
facts the hearer wants to know. Testimony- based beliefs are ‘second- hand’ 
beliefs, beliefs formed through deference to, or dependence on, the word – 
the testimony – of another. 4 
 Given our distinction between justifi cation and the anti- luck condition, I divide 
the epistemology of testimony into two questions: 
 (i)  What is testimonial justifi cation? When and why are testimony- based 
beliefs justifi ed? 
 (ii)  What is testimonial knowledge? When a hearer forms a justifi ed true 
testimony- based belief, when and why does the hearer satisfy the anti- luck 
condition? 5 
 But before discussing those questions, we should fi rst decide whether testimonial 
knowledge is even possible. 
 4.  Th e possibility of knowledge transmission 
 John Locke is frequently quoted as claiming that testimonial knowledge is not 
even possible:
 For, I think, we may as rationally hope to see with other men’s eyes as to know by 
other men’s understandings. So much as we ourselves consider and comprehend 
of truth and reason, so much we possess of real and true knowledge. Th e fl oating 
of other men’s opinions in our brains makes us not one jot the more knowing, 
thought they happen to be true . . . In the sciences, every one has so much as he 
really knows and comprehends. What he believes only, and takes upon trust, are 
but shreds; which, however well in the whole piece, make no considerable addition 
to his stock who gathers them. Such borrowed wealth, like fairy money, though it 
were gold in the hand from which he received it, will be but leaves and dust when 
it comes to use. ( Essay Concerning Human Understanding , Bk I,  ch. III , sec. 24) 
 People read this as denying the very possibility of testimonial knowledge, of the 
transmission of knowledge – gold – from one mind to another; all that results 
from deference and dependence is shreds and dust. 
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 Th is strikes nearly everyone as incredible; we are deeply social creatures aft er 
all, living lives of massive mutual interdependence. Surely we learn (come to 
know) enormous amounts from relying on others. Locke’s British intellectual 
heir, David Hume, famously remarked that ‘there is no species of reasoning 
more common, more useful, and even necessary to human life, than that 
which is derived from the testimony of men, and the reports of eye- witnesses 
and spectators’ ( Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding , sec. 10, para. 5). 
As opposed to Locke and in line with Hume, common sense, it seems, asserts 
that knowledge from one mind to another can be, and oft en is, transmitted 
through testimony. C. A. J. Coady (1992: 389) agrees: ‘If S knows that P . . . then 
S can bring his listeners to know that P by telling them that P.’ Elizabeth Fricker 
(1987: 57) claims: ‘If S’s belief is knowledge, then we may allow that title to H’s 
belief too.’ And Tyler Burge (1993: 477) asserts: ‘If one has acquired one’s belief 
from others in the normal way, and if the others know the proposition, then 
one acquires knowledge.’ A cursory review of the literature on this question will 
result in a score of similar passages. Indeed, the agreement is so widespread on 
this issue that it must form a piece of our folk epistemology. 
 Although it goes without saying, these passages require qualifi cation:  the 
knowledge is transferred only if the hearer is also justifi ed in forming the 
corresponding testimony- based belief. If someone knows that P and tells you 
that P, but you have every reason to believe that they are either lying or mistaken, 
then it is far from obvious, and probably false, that you would come to know that 
P by believing them. 
 Is the speaker’s knowledge that P also necessary for a hearer’s testimonial 
knowledge that P? Th e answer here, too, seems to be in the affi  rmative: a hearer 
can acquire testimonial knowledge that P only if the speaker has knowledge that 
P to transmit. If the speaker doesn’t have the knowledge to transmit, how could 
the hearer, in depending on the speaker, acquire knowledge? Magic? 
 Commentators agree. Robert Audi ( 1997 : 410) says:  ‘My testimony cannot 
give you testimonially grounded knowledge that P without my knowing that P.’ 
Tyler Burge (1993: 486) writes:  ‘If a recipient depends upon interlocution for 
knowledge, the recipient’s knowledge depends on the source’s knowledge as 
well.’ Angus Ross ( 1986 :  62) asserts:  ‘Your telling me that P can only be said 
to provide me with knowledge if you know that P.’ And Michael Welbourne 
( 1986 : 302) says: ‘It is necessary, if there is to be a successful process of testimonial 
transmission, that the speaker have knowledge to communicate.’ 
 Philosophical refl ection, in line with common sense, reveals that ( pace Locke) 
testimony transfers knowledge from one mind to another. 6 
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 5.  Testimonial justifi cation: reductionism 
versus anti- reductionism 
 Th is brings us back to our two questions:  what is testimonial justifi cation, 
and what is testimonial knowledge? In this section I discuss the fi rst question; 
I discuss the second in the subsequent two sections. 
 Why are we justifi ed, when we are, in believing another’s testimony? Th ere 
are two opposing perspectives on this question. Th e so- called anti- reductionist 
believes that we enjoy a default epistemic right to take the assertions and 
testimonies of others at face value. If someone tells you that P, you have a default 
defeasible epistemic right or entitlement to believe that P; testimony- based 
beliefs are default defeasibly justifi ed. Tyler Burge ( 1993 ,  2013 ) calls this the 
‘Acceptance Principle’:
 A person is entitled to accept a proposition that is presented as true and that is 
intelligible to him or her, unless there are stronger reasons not to. 
 When Burge advances this principle, he is working within a broadly reliabilist 
view of justifi cation (or ‘warrant’), where entitlement (his word for justifi cation 
or warrant that does not rely on having a reason or reasons) entails the reliability 
of the belief- forming competence in normal conditions when functioning 
normally (Burge  1993 ,  2013 ; Graham forthcoming). Very roughly, his idea is 
that, when you take someone to have told you that P, you enjoy a prima facie 
defeasible epistemic entitlement to believe what they tell you, for your ability 
to comprehend others reliably leads to true beliefs in normal conditions when 
functioning normally: relying on others (in normal conditions) is a good route 
to truth. 
 Th omas Reid advanced a similar view in the eighteenth century. In section 
24 of  chapter 6 of his  Inquiry into the Human Mind (1764), he argued that there 
were two principles of human social psychology that tallied with one another – 
the principles of veracity and of credulity.
 Th e wise and benefi cent Author of Nature, who intended that we should be 
social creatures, and that we should receive the greatest and most important 
part of our knowledge by the information of others, hath, for these purposes, 
implanted in our natures two principles that tally . . . Th e fi rst . . . is a propensity 
to speak truth  . . . so as to convey our real sentiments. Th is principle has a 
powerful operation, even in the greatest liars; for where they lie once, they speak 
truth a hundred times. Truth is always uppermost, and is the natural issue of 
the mind. It requires no art or training, no inducement or temptation, but only 
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that we yield to a natural impulse. Lying, on the contrary, is doing violence 
to our nature; and is never practised, even by the worst men, without some 
temptation. . . . Another original principle implanted in us by the Supreme Being, 
is a disposition to confi de in the veracity of others, and to believe what they tell 
us . . . [T] he former . . . may be called the principle of veracity [and the latter] we 
shall . . . call this the principle of credulity. It is unlimited in children, until they 
meet with instances of deceit and falsehood: and it retains a very considerable 
degree of strength through life. 
 Th e result of these paired principles of human psychology is that true 
information, for the most part, fl ows reliably from one mind to another. Or so 
Reid believes. 
 Although Reid attributes this fortunate epistemic situation to the wisdom and 
good will of the Supreme Being, most contemporary followers of this broadly 
Reidian view would ground our social psychologies in our evolutionary and 
cultural history, cultivated in diff erent ways by our varying social norms and 
traditions. I’ll touch again on this issue. 
 Burge, however, ambitiously argues that the ground of the reliability of 
assertive communication lies not in our social psychologies, but rather in the 
very nature of reason. Famously, he argued that the Acceptance Principle is a 
priori true, for the reliability of assertive communication in normal conditions 
when functioning normally follows from the very nature of the expression of 
propositional content as a sign of reason, and the very nature of reason as a sign 
of truth. Regrettably, space does not allow for discussion of Burge’s ambitious 
argument for this surprising conclusion. 7 
 Without assuming that anti- reductionists are ‘simple’ reliabilists about 
epistemic justifi cation (generally, they’re not), let’s assume that behind the spirit 
of anti- reductionism is the assumption that our default defeasible entitlement 
involves the reliability of assertive communication in normal conditions. 
 Not everyone agrees that the Acceptance Principle is true. Th ose who reject 
the Principle are oft en called reductionists. Th ey deny that we can take for 
granted, in the absence of defeating evidence, that other people are trustworthy. 
Reductionists believe that, in order to be justifi ed in believing what another 
tells you, you need independent, non- essentially testimony- based, positive 
reasons for believing that the person is sincere and competent on the occasion, 
either because  testimony is generally trustworthy, or because  they are generally 
trustworthy, or because they are apt to be trustworthy  on this occasion . Th e 
reductionist believes another’s report that P as such is epistemically neutral on 
the question whether P; on its own, it provides no support to believe that P. 
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 Th eir main intuitive motivation seems to be this: you just can’t trust other 
people to be as reliable as you need them to be. Th ere is too much mendacity 
and honest error, too many sources for error in the chain of communication, to 
simply risk believing what other people tell you. Indeed, for all that you know, 
most testimony may be misleading. To avoid being duped, either intentionally 
or accidentally, you need to sort out the good from the bad, and that requires 
positive non- testimonial grounds for thinking that your source is sincere or 
reliable or both. Not doing so is a recipe for objectionable gullibility (Fricker 
 1994 : 144– 5). 8 
 Th e structure of this debate between the reductionist and the anti- 
reductionist parallels an older debate over perceptual justifi cation. Th e classical 
foundationalist held that beliefs formed through perception about the external 
world were not prima facie justifi ed (experiences as such were neutral guides to 
external reality), but instead required for their justifi cation background support 
from more ‘basic’ or ‘fundamental’ beliefs about the characteristic patterns 
of our own consciously known inner sensations and perceptual experiences. 
From beliefs about the patterns of inner experience, we would then infer the 
characteristics and existence of objects in the external world, presumably via an 
inference to the best explanation. Th e justifi cation for beliefs about the external 
world then ‘reduced’ to the justifi cation for beliefs about our own minds and 
what we can in turn infer about the external world from those. Th e classical 
foundationalist’s opponent (oft en called ‘moderate’ foundationalism) insisted 
instead that perceptual beliefs about the external world are justifi ed ‘directly’ 
by the perceptual experiences (perceptual representations) that cause them. 
Th ere was then no need to ‘reduce’ perceptual justifi cation to any other form 
of justifi cation; we enjoy default entitlement to take perceptual experience at 
face value. 
 You should now see the parallel, and the point of the labels. Reductionists about 
testimony think that testimonial justifi cation reduces to fi rst- hand justifi cation 
through perception, stored in memory, and extended through reasoning (for 
testimony as such is epistemically neutral; the fact that someone told you that P is 
no right on its own to believe that P), just as reductionists about perception think 
that perceptual justifi cation reduces to other sources (for perceptual experience 
as such is epistemically neutral; the fact that it perceptually appears to you as if 
P is not right on its own to believe that P). Anti- reductionists about testimony 
think that testimonial justifi cation doesn’t so reduce, but instead stands on its 
own two feet, just as anti- reductionists about perception think that perceptual 
justifi cation doesn’t reduce to other more ‘basic’ sources of justifi cation. 9 
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 What is the main motivation for anti- reductionism? Here is the standard 
argument. First, most of our testimony- based beliefs are justifi ed. Second, 
as a matter of fact we lack the reductive non- testimonial reasons required to 
reductively justify the extent of our reliance on testimony. Th e full extent of the 
justifi cation for our testimony- based beliefs thus does not ‘reduce’ to a non- 
testimonial basis (see, especially, Coady [ 1992 ]). Th e anti- reductionist sees the 
reductionist alternative as overly demanding. 10 
 Although many people fi nd this point against the reductionist compelling, it 
has its detractors. 11 Instead of pausing to evaluate these replies, let me rehearse 
instead its most plausible instance: childhood testimony. Children form justifi ed 
testimony- based beliefs, even before the age of two. From two years onwards, 
they are deeply dependent for information on what other people tell them, 
especially on topics they cannot observe for themselves (Harris  2012 ; Harris and 
Lane  2014 ). Infants and young children have a strong and adaptive tendency to 
rely on testimony (Cole, Harris, and Koenig  2012 ). But children lack some of 
the conceptual resources to formulate meta- arguments about the reliability of 
their interlocutors. Th ey also lack suffi  cient fi rst- hand evidence to justify the 
premises in those arguments, even if they can formulate them. And, last, even 
if they have the evidence and can formulate the arguments, it is unlikely that 
they rely on that evidence and formulate those arguments; they seem to lack 
the executive ability. Th us, if children have justifi ed testimony- based beliefs, 
but they cannot ‘reduce’ that justifi cation to justifi cation from other sources, 
then testimony- based beliefs do not require positive non- testimonial reasons 
for their justifi cation. 12 
 Th ere have been two main responses to this argument in the literature. Th e 
fi rst denies that children have justifi ed testimony- based beliefs; since they lack 
the positive reasons, they lack justifi ed beliefs (e.g. van Cleve  2006 ). Th e second 
denies that children lack the positive reasons – recent developmental psychology 
has shown us that children are smarter than we think they are. I simply reject 
the fi rst reply. As for the second, too much time would be needed to review it. 
Suffi  ce it to say that the recent evidence from developmental psychology, in my 
view, shows no such thing. 13 
 Fricker ( 1995 ) off ers a unique and telling reply. She grants the case for 
children but then goes coherentist for adults. Th at is, an Acceptance Principle is 
true for justifi ed testimony- based beliefs when the hearer has little to go on by 
way of background support (the childhood case), but then coherentism is true 
when the hearer has a coherent set of beliefs to deploy to justify her reliance on 
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testimony (the adult case). By my lights, this is just to grant anti- reductionism. 
First, it grants the case where background belief is insuffi  cient. Second, it grants 
the anti- reductionist argument against the distinctively  reductionist requirement 
on background reasons. Th ird, the existence and relevance of coherent 
background beliefs is fully compatible with anti- reductionism (Graham  2006c ). 
Fourth, without embracing coherentism, the anti- reductionist can even explain 
why so many of those background beliefs are justifi ed, and thus relevant to new 
testimony- based beliefs: those background beliefs were themselves justifi ed by 
testimony, not by further reductive background beliefs (Graham  2006b ; Burge 
 2013 ). A main concern of Fricker’s, it seems to me, is not the abstract issue of the 
structure of testimonial justifi cation, but instead the feared laziness or epistemic 
irresponsibility that might result if a believer took the Acceptance Principle 
as a license to ignore relevant background beliefs, or to ignore evidence of 
untrustworthiness on the speaker’s part. And that concern is shared equally by 
the anti- reductionist. 
 Th e reductionist thinks that the Acceptance Principle is too permissive; the 
anti- reductionist thinks that the alternative is just too demanding. Is there a way 
to settle this debate? 14 Let me off er three points in favour of anti- reductionism. 
First, as I just remarked, the Acceptance Principle is not a recommendation to 
ignore counterevidence:  it’s not a policy or a license to hand over all of your 
thinking to what other people tell you, willy- nilly. Second (and relatedly), the 
Acceptance Principle is fully compatible with hearer’s possessing, developing, 
and deploying fi lters and countermeasures. Various forms of monitoring and 
epistemic vigilance are not only compatible with the Acceptance Principle 
(compare analogous fi lters and monitors for perceptual justifi cation), but are 
oft en recommended by anti- reductionists (Goldberg and Henderson  2006 ; 
Henderson  2008 ; Graham  2010 ; Sperber et  al.  2010 ). Th ird, reductionist 
anxiety is nearly always driven by armchair considerations. Although this is not 
objectionable as such, one might naturally wonder what the empirical evidence 
suggests. Surprisingly, empirical studies suggest that ‘gullibility’ isn’t such a bad 
thing, especially if our goal is to promote truth and avoid error (Michaelian  2010 ; 
Shieber  2014 ; Ahlstrom- Vij  2016 ). Some initial computer modelling reaches a 
similar conclusion (Zollman  2015 ). I  think these three points, individually 
and collectively, squarely place the burden of proof on the reductionist. Th is 
conclusion should not be surprising, once we recognize not only the  extent of 
our reliance on other people for information, but the extent of our  nature as 
social beings. 
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 6.  Counterexamples to transmission 
 I now turn to our question about testimonial knowledge: when and why does 
a hearer satisfy the anti- luck condition? You might think that the answer to 
this question is easy. Since the speaker knows and thereby satisfi es the anti- 
luck condition, the hearer has only to satisfy the justifi cation condition to come 
to know. Th e neat thing about testimonial knowledge is that the speaker (in 
possessing knowledge) does the work for the hearer. Problem solved. Hence, we 
don’t need an independent treatment for the hearer, beyond an account of the 
hearer’s justifi cation. Th is seems to be the point behind the common- sense view 
that testimony  transfers knowledge. 
 Unfortunately, the issue isn’t so easily resolved. Even if the speaker has 
knowledge, that may not be enough for the hearer to satisfy the anti- luck 
condition. Here’s an example of just that possibility (modifi ed from Nozick 
[ 1981 ]):
 HOSPITAL. A father knows his son is fi ne today, even though his son suff ers 
serious health problems. Th e father’s mother (the son’s grandmother) is sick in 
the hospital. When the father visits, he tells her that her grandson is fi ne. But if 
his son were sick (or even dead), he would not tell her, so as not to upset her. 
Although the father knows his son his well, his mother does not learn from him, 
for he would easily tell her that her grandson is fi ne even when that is not so. 
Relying on his testimony about her grandson’s well- being, she would easily form 
a false belief. 15 
 Th e hearer forms a justifi ed true testimony- based belief, but the hearer doesn’t 
acquire knowledge, for in a sense the hearer’s true belief is just luckily true. 
Although the speaker has knowledge to transmit, and the hearer (we assume) 
has every right to believe the speaker (and so forms a justifi ed belief), something 
goes wrong. 
 Matters get even worse for the simple common- sense answer, for it may be 
possible for a hearer’s justifi ed testimony- based belief to satisfy the anti- luck 
condition, even though the speaker does not have knowledge to transmit, so 
it cannot be that the speaker’s knowledge that secures the hearer’s knowledge. 
Here is a variant of a much discussed case (Graham  2000b ,  2006a ,  2016b ):
 FOSSIL. A devout creationist teaches at a public school where she must teach 
a section on evolutionary theory. She does not believe a word of it, but is a 
dedicated and responsible teacher. She develops a near- expert understanding 
based on deep reading of books and articles on evolutionary science. She 
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even develops a deep understanding of fossils that parallels highly skilled 
scientifi cally trained expertise. On a fi eld trip, she discovers a fossil that proves 
that ancient humans once lived in this area (itself a surprising discovery that no 
one previously knew). Although she does not believe it, when she tells this to her 
students, they believe her. Because of her commitment to teaching, her exposure 
to evolutionary science, and her mastery of fossils, she would not say what she 
did unless it were true. Relying on their teacher, the schoolchildren would not 
easily be mistaken when coming to believe what she tells them. Th e children 
come to know something that no one has ever previously known. 
 As I  said, variants have been much discussed (Lackey  1999 ; Carter and Nickel 
 2014 ). 16 Although many people are willing to accept that knowledge transmission 
does not always succeed (as in HOSPITAL), people fi nd FOSSIL much harder to 
accept. How can children acquire knowledge from relying on another, if the sender 
doesn’t have knowledge to pass along? Th at’s like borrowing money from someone 
who doesn’t have any to lend. How can someone give you something that they 
themselves don’t have? So, how can the speaker ensure that the hearer meets the 
anti- luck condition for knowledge, if the speaker doesn’t have knowledge herself? 
 Digging in their heels against the intuitive force of the example, people have 
tried three diff erent replies. First, people have argued that, even though it looks 
like the children acquire knowledge, they really don’t, for on closer inspection the 
teacher has a fl aw that prevents her from inducing knowledge in her pupils: she 
doesn’t always tell them what she believes (when it comes to evolutionary science, 
she tells them what the science would say, and not what she believes). But this 
isn’t very persuasive. It would mean that they never learn from their teacher (and 
that you can never learn anything from someone who isn’t completely honest 
with you about everything). And, aft er all, isn’t it intuitive that, because she relies 
 on the science , the children are clearly positioned to acquire knowledge from her 
(Burge  2013 )? 
 Second, people have argued that, although it looks like the children form 
testimony- based beliefs, they are really relying on their background beliefs 
about the reliability of their schoolteachers and their fi rst- hand, independently 
acquired knowledge of this teacher’s track- record for telling the truth. Th eir 
beliefs are more ‘fi rst- hand’ than ‘second- hand’, and so they are not really 
deferring to their teacher or epistemically depending on her expertise as opposed 
to their own, and so they are not really forming testimony- based beliefs, and 
so their knowledge isn’t  testimonial knowledge aft er all (Audi  2006 ; Fricker 
 2006 ). But this isn’t very persuasive. Th e children are young children; they are 
not nascent critical reasoners sorting out which teacher to trust and which to 
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ignore. Th ey are schoolchildren, aft er all, there to learn from their teachers. If 
anyone learns from deferring to others, to depending on the expertise of their 
informants, small children do. 
 Th ird, people have argued that, even though the children acquire knowledge 
from the teacher and form genuinely testimony- based beliefs, they don’t acquire 
 testimonial knowledge. ‘Testimonial knowledge’, they say,
 is essentially knowledge from another person’s knowledge through testimony. 
If the speaker doesn’t have knowledge to transmit, it is  a priori analytically 
impossible for the hearer to acquire  testimonial knowledge; testimonial 
knowledge is knowledge  secured from someone else’s knowledge . It’s just a part of 
the very concept, or the very idea, of  testimonial knowledge. It is what the phrase 
‘testimonial knowledge’  means . 
 So, even though the children acquire knowledge through epistemic dependence 
on their teacher’s assertion (they form a testimony- based belief that is 
knowledge), they don’t acquire  testimonial knowledge. 
 I’ve never found this reply very persuasive, but I’m happy to grant it. I shall 
not, that is, dispute about a word. Th e children then acquire  testimonial 
knowledge * (testimony- based belief that is knowledge) but not  testimonial 
knowledge (knowledge that a priori analytically entails knowledge from a 
speaker’s knowledge). Although all  testimonial knowledge is also testimonial 
knowledge*, not all testimonial knowledge* is  testimonial knowledge. 
 But, having made this linguistic concession, I shall ignore it. For the interesting 
and worthwhile category of inquiry is not the narrower category of testimonial 
knowledge, but is instead the broader category of testimonial knowledge*. Th at, 
I believe, is the category we should strive to understand. I’ll give a brief argument 
for this at the end of the next section. 
 We still need an answer to our second question:  how and why do hearers 
satisfy the anti- luck condition when forming justifi ed true testimony- based 
beliefs? Th e answer from refl ection on common sense – that the speaker knows, 
and so the speaker, in satisfying the anti- luck condition, takes care of for the 
hearer – didn’t work. We need to dig a little deeper. 
 7.  A safe- basis account of testimonial knowledge 
 Maybe we should choose a proposed anti- luck condition, and see where that 
leads. Since Gettier published his short article in  1963 , there has been no 
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shortage of attempts to articulate the correct ‘fourth’ or ‘anti- luck’ condition 
on propositional knowledge. Th e issue is still a matter of controversy, well over 
fi ft y years later. Even so, a handful of leading contenders have emerged: the ‘no- 
essential falsehoods’ account, the ‘defeasibility’ account, the Dretske- Nozick 
‘sensitivity’ account (Dretske  1971 ; Nozick  1981 ), and the ‘safety’ account 
(proposed by Luper- Foy [ 1984 ] and Sosa [ 1999 ]; taken up by Pritchard [ 2005 ], 
among others). Although the points I am about to make are compatible with 
both the sensitivity and the safety accounts, for reasons that need not detain us 
I prefer to work with the safety account over the sensitivity one. And the other 
accounts, to my mind, tend to over- intellectualize propositional knowledge: they 
start at the wrong end of the spectrum. But that’s a debate for another day. In the 
rest of this section I will explain the safety account, and then put it to work in 
answering our question, to see where it leads. 
 According to the safety account, propositional knowledge that P is (justifi ed, 
true) belief that P held on a  safe basis. When is a true belief that P held on a 
safe basis? When holding the belief that P on that basis, you would not easily 
be mistaken. When would you not easily be mistaken? Th is is usually glossed in 
terms of possible worlds: a true belief that P is held on a safe basis just in case, in 
each nearby possible world, if one forms a belief within that world on the same 
basis as in the actual world, then one forms a true belief in that world. 17 
 How does the safe- basis account apply to our cases? Take HOSPITAL. Th e 
father knows that his son is healthy; he believes on a safe- basis (perception, 
testimony, background knowledge, etc.), so he would not easily be mistaken. 
But his mother’s belief that her grandson is healthy (from her son’s testimony) 
is not formed on a safe basis, for there is a nearby world where she relies on her 
son’s testimony to the eff ect that her grandson is fi ne but she forms a false belief. 
Th at’s why she doesn’t acquire knowledge from him, even though he knows that 
his son (her grandson) is fi ne. 18 
 Now take FOSSIL. Th e schoolteacher relies on a safe- basis (careful 
observation, a sophisticated understanding of the contents of evolutionary 
theory and the fossil record, etc.) to reach the conclusion  – a conclusion she 
‘accepts’ but, because of her personal convictions, does not believe – that ancient 
humans once lived in this area:  she relies on a safe- basis to reach a cognitive 
state of ‘acceptance’ but not of belief (cf. Bratman [ 1992 ]). ‘Accepting’ that 
conclusion, she tells the children that ancient humans once lived in the area. 
Young schoolchildren being young schoolchildren, they believe her. Her 
‘acceptance’ results from a safe- basis, and she wouldn’t say what she does unless 
it was formed on such a basis, and so her testimony, too, is a safe- basis for the 
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schoolchildren. When they believe her, they, too, form a belief on a safe- basis. 
Relying on her testimony, the schoolchildren would not easily be mistaken. 
Th at’s why they come to know something, something that (as the example goes) 
no one has previously known. 19 
 Th e safe- basis account also allows us to argue that ordinary cases (where a 
speaker transfers knowledge) and unusual cases (like FOSSIL) fall within the 
same epistemic kind. Imagine an ordinary case where knowledge transfers. 
Why did that happen? Because the speaker believed on a safe basis, which 
partly explains why her assertion is a safe basis for the hearer, which partly 
explains why the hearer forms a belief on a safe basis. What happened in the 
FOSSIL case? Th e speaker did not believe on a safe basis, but she did ‘accept’ 
on a safe basis, which then partly explains why she asserts on a safe basis, 
and so on. Th e underlying ‘epistemic mechanics’ is the same in both so- 
called  testimonial knowledge cases and what I called testimonial knowledge* 
cases. But if the epistemic mechanics are the same, the epistemic kinds are 
the same. I  conclude that the ‘broader’ category of testimonial knowledge* 
is the category that we want to understand if we want to understand the 
epistemology of testimony, especially the transmission of knowledge from one 
mind to another. 
 Aft er all, knowledge per se does not transfer from one mind to another. 
Suppose that I have some perceptual knowledge. Th en I have knowledge on a 
safe- basis, where the basis involves perception and perceptual experience. Th en 
I tell you, and you learn from me. Did I transfer my perceptual experience to 
you? Do you now have exactly what I have? No, not at all. You have neither my 
 perceptual knowledge nor my  perceptual warrant. But you do have knowledge, 
 testimonial knowledge. Why? Because you formed a belief on a safe basis, because 
the epistemic force (the safety) of my perceptual belief was transferred through 
testimony to your belief. Testimony transmits  epistemic force  – it transmits the 
safety of one basis (perception) to the safety of another basis (comprehension 
and belief) through the safety of a medium (assertion, telling). Testimony 
doesn’t  transmit my knowledge to you per se. Th at’s why the motivation for the 
so- called narrower category ‘ testimonial knowledge’ (as knowledge essentially 
derived from someone else’s knowledge) puts the wrong foot forward. 20 It is not 
the speaker’s knowledge that secures knowledge for the hearer; it is the epistemic 
force supporting the speaker’s belief that secures the epistemic force supporting 
the hearer’s belief. Th e same story explains unusual cases like FOSSIL:  same 
epistemic mechanism, same epistemic kind. 
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 8.  Th e reliability of testimony and social norms 
 But why, you might ask, is testimony reliable enough for justifi ed uptake and 
knowledge? Consistent with everything else that we know about ourselves, what 
explains the reliability of testimony? 
 Th ere is so much to say about this topic that I can barely begin to scratch the 
surface. I’ll make three quick remarks, and then discuss one answer in a little 
more detail, just to take a stab at this important issue. 
 First, there’s always the possibility, consistent with Reid, that it is a part of 
our God- given nature. Second, there’s the parallel possibility, consistent with the 
growing literature on the evolution of cooperation, that we’re born to be helpful, 
especially in communication. Young children are especially helpful at providing 
information, unprompted, to adults in apparent need (Tomasello  2009 ). For 
a similar reason, parents tell their children the truth out of parental concern. 
Th ird, it is obviously frequently the case that, to coordinate with others, we need 
to tell the truth (I’ll need to tell you the correct time that my fl ight arrives if you 
are going to pick me up). Another answer, consistent with these three, is that 
human life is governed by socially shared prescriptions  – social norms  – for 
telling the truth and providing useful information. It’s this last answer I’ll discuss 
in a little more detail. 
 What’s a social norm? According to Cristina Bicchieri ( 2006 ,  2014 ,  2017 ), a 
social norm is not merely a collective pattern of behaviour in a group. Everyone 
may want to stay warm when they go out, and so everyone may wear a coat 
during the winter, so we are all behaving the same way. But that’s not a social 
norm; that is a social custom, a pattern of behaviour in a group where everyone 
acts the same way because we all have the same needs and we’ve all discovered 
the same solution. A social norm is not a trend or a fashion either, where people 
imitate a crowd or follow the leader to go along or to simply rely on what 
probably works. Nor is a social norm a convention, where people act the same 
way in a recurrent situation to coordinate their behaviour, such as driving on the 
right- hand side of the road in the United States. 
 According to Bicchieri, social norms are patterns of behaviour that are 
collectively approved or disapproved in a group or population, and enforced by 
informal sanctions, positive and negative. Social norms arise from (1) (second- 
order) beliefs we have that other people believe we ought  – normatively and 
not just prudentially  – to behave a certain way (these are normative social 
expectations), and (2) a conditional preference to behave a certain way, provided 
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we believe that other people believe we ought to believe that way (a preference to 
meet normative social expectations). Th e conditional preference exists because 
of the sanctions, oft en external but also internal. Positive sanctions include 
tangible rewards, praise, status, reputation, and so on. Negative sanctions for 
censured behaviour include punishments, shaming, ostracism, ridicule, and so 
on. Oft en just thinking that others would disapprove can stop us in our tracks. 
Likewise, just thinking that others would approve might lead us to conform 
( Pettit 1990; Graham  2015b ). 21 
 Social norms  – our normative expectations and conditional preferences to 
conform  – then strongly motivate compliance. ‘With social norms’, Bicchieri 
( 2017 :  34– 5) explains, ‘the normative infl uence is strong and plays a crucial 
role in driving compliance. It matters to us that most people in our reference 
network believe we ought to conform to a certain behavioural pattern. Th is point 
must be emphasized . . . [T] he social pressure to conform, expressed in social 
expectation that one ought to conform, is a powerful motivator.’ And it is the 
pressure to conform, enforced by sanctions, that really does a good deal of the 
motivational work. For, left  to ourselves, we oft en prefer not to conform. Indeed, 
many social norms emerge as solutions to social dilemmas, where narrow 
individual self- interest might lead us to behave in non- cooperative ways, such 
as prisoner’s dilemmas and public goods games. ‘With a [social] norm, there is 
oft en the temptation to transgress it – this is precisely why norms must be socially 
enforced’ (39). 
 However, sometimes we internalize the norm, so that we positively value the 
behaviour, and we might conform, regardless of social expectations. ‘Especially 
with norms that are well established, norm followers tend to value what the norm 
stands for. An external observer may be induced to think that, since people have 
a positive attitude toward a norm, they may obey it regardless of what others 
around them do’ (40). Even so, personal values  – our personal normative 
attitudes – oft en fall short of motivating behaviour (Fishbein  1967 ; Eagly and 
Chaiken  1993 ), so that social expectations and conditional preferences oft en 
play a much stronger role than meets the eye. 
 What if truth- telling is a social norm? What if we believe that other people 
believe that we ought to tell the truth, and what if we also believe that there are 
rewards for conformity and costs for noncompliance? Th en we’ll be motivated, 
in addition to any other motivations that might already be in place, to tell the 
truth. Th e social pressure to conform would then be a powerful motivator. We 
might even positively value telling the truth. 
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 Is it? Yes, indeed. It’s a textbook case of a social norm: open any textbook 
discussion of social norms, and  tell the truth will surely be on the shortlist of 
examples. In her contribution to a recent introductory anthology of social 
science, Bicchieri ( 2014 : 208) proclaims that ‘[e] ach group has its own norms, 
and some, like reciprocity or truth telling, [are] very general, spanning all 
groups’. When providing examples of social norms in his book  Social Action , 
Seumas Miller ( 2001 ) lists refraining from violence, remaining faithful to one’s 
spouse, avoiding incest, keeping promises, telling the truth. Bowles and Gintis 
( 2011 ) emphasize a number of times the social norm that one ought to tell the 
truth. Philip Pettit (1990) treats truth- telling as the central case in his work on 
social norms. As I said, it’s a textbook case. 
 Social norms are surely a part of the story – a very complex story – as to why 
testimony is as reliable as it is, not just in general but in varying domains and 
in diff erent situations. Although maybe the Supreme Being didn’t implant the 
principle of veracity in our hearts, it has a powerful operation in our lives, even so. 22 
 Notes 
 1  Testimony was discussed by Locke, Hume, Reid, and Kant (among others), but 
then was for the most part marginalized until the late twentieth century. Michael 
Welbourne ( 1986 ) was oft en a lone voice in the 1970s, later joined by Elizabeth 
Fricker, among others, in the 1980s. Th en Coady’s ( 1992 ) book and Burge’s ( 1993 ) 
essay stirred considerable interest in the early 1990s, which led to a handful of 
dissertations completed by the end of the 1990s and then a fl owering of interest that 
continues unabated, including the recent publication of two excellent textbooks 
(Gelfert  2014 ; Shieber  2015 ). 
 2  I won’t pretend to be as exhaustive or even- handed as possible – I’ll be opinionated, 
for sure – but I’ll do my best in the space available. For other ways of orienting the 
literature, I recommend Fricker ( 2004 ), Lackey ( 2011 ), Adler ( 2012 ), Greco ( 2012 ), 
Gelfert ( 2014 ), Goldman and Blanchard ( 2015 ), and Shieber ( 2015 ). Th ere are issues 
that I will sideline, including disagreement, epistemic injustice, group knowledge, and 
group testimony, whether the reliability of a process, or even the cognitive process 
itself, somehow interestingly ‘extends’ to the speaker (Goldberg  2010 ), among other 
issues. And the assurance view, regrettably, will receive only the barest mention. For 
the assurance view, see Ross ( 1986 ), Moran ( 2005 ), McMyler ( 2011 ), and Hinchman 
( 2014 ); against it, see Lackey (2008),  Schmitt ( 2010 ), and Owens ( 2017 ). 
 3  For an up- to- date discussion, see Hetherington ( 2016 ). 
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 4  For discussion of testimony as a speech act, see Graham ( 1997 ,  2015a ). For more 
discussion of testimony- based beliefs, see Graham ( 2015a , 2016).  
 5  Not every participant to the literature sharply distinguishes these two questions, 
sometimes resulting in unnecessary confusion. Robert Audi ( 1997 ), however, 
sharply distinguishes these two, arguing that a hearer can acquire testimonial 
knowledge without simultaneously acquiring a justifi ed testimony- based belief. 
Audi relies on a general framework where knowledge is belief based on a reliable 
indicator, and justifi ed belief is belief based on accessible justifi ers that can be cited 
when justifying the belief. 
 6  For the record, I think that this representation of Locke is far from the truth. For 
one, in context this passage is targeting an almost blind deference to the so- called 
‘authority of others’ on matters of theological and abstract philosophical aff airs, 
exactly the kind of topic where Locke, as a spokesperson of the Enlightenment, 
believed that we can, and should, think for ourselves. For another, Locke also had 
a very diff erent  conception of knowledge than we have today. On his  conception 
of knowledge, knowledge is the perceived agreement or disagreement among 
ideas (roughly, but not entirely, what we would consider knowledge of self- 
evident truths and what can be self- evidently deduced from self- evident truths). 
Given that conception of  knowledge , you cannot just acquire knowledge from 
relying on someone who knows, for even though they have perceived the relevant 
agreements among ideas to reach a conclusion, it does not follow that by believing 
their testimony you will ipso facto perceive the relevant agreement among ideas 
yourself. Hume probably would have agreed with Locke, for they probably shared 
this conception of knowledge. So even the quotation from Hume is, for the 
opposite reason, also a little misleading. Furthermore, in line with the quotation 
from Hume, in Book IV of the  Essay Locke includes testimony as a ‘ground of 
probability’: namely, a ground for reasonable belief – what in many cases  we would 
count as knowledge. In sum, Locke probably did not mean what most people 
who cite this passage take him to mean (see Shieber [2009] for more discussion). 
Regardless, this representation of Locke is a useful foil for common sense, which is 
why I started with it. 
 7  See Graham (forthcoming) for critical exposition and discussion of Burge’s 
argumentation. Th ere’s a tendency to equate Burge’s a priori defence of the 
Principle with the truth of the Principle, so that if the Principle isn’t a priori 
necessary then it isn’t even true (van Cleve 1996; Faulkner  2011 ). Burge assumes 
the Principle and then asks for its basis. Th e Principle, as we’ve just implied, might 
have more than one basis: God, evolution by natural selection, human psychology, 
social psychology, social structures, the nature of promising and the institutions 
of promising, and so on, or the very nature of reason itself. Burge opts for the last 
option. His account of its basis may fall short without the Principle falling short in 
any way. 
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  8  For other arguments, see Fricker (1987,  2004 ,  2016 )  and Lackey (2008). Lackey 
thinks that she has a persuasive counterexample to anti- reductionism. Imagine 
stumbling across an apparent diary written apparently in English, where it is clear 
to you that it was written by an alien from another planet. You possess no positive 
reasons for what it says, and simultaneously you possess, she says, no defeating 
reasons not to believe what it says. But intuitively, she thinks, you are not justifi ed 
in believing what it says. Generalizing, every testimony- based belief requires non- 
testimonial support. I don’t agree. By my lights, a mature adult will be puzzled by 
the fact that it was an alien, and so is surely to have defeaters. Perrine (2014: 3236) 
argues along these lines: the adult in Lackey’s case ‘has a wealth of background 
knowledge that ought to make him skeptical in this case’ (cf. Burge 2013). However, 
it the recipient were a young child who could read but had few thoughts, if any, 
about the consequences of the author’s alien status, then we’d have a case of no 
reasons on either side. But then it seems fi ne to say that child has a prima facie 
justifi ed testimony- based belief. 
  9  I provide more detailed formulations of some of these issues elsewhere (2006,  
forthcoming). For testimony afi cionados, there are two possible ways to frame the 
reductionism/ anti- reductionism debate. One is about justifi cation (that is how I see 
it); the other is about knowledge (about converting true belief into knowledge). 
If you see it the latter way, then you see the reductionist as saying that a true 
testimony- based belief, provided that it is reductively justifi ed (usually inductively 
by a track- record), is then knowledge: to really ‘reduce’ the hearer’s  knowledge 
to perception, memory, and induction, everything required  for knowledge must 
‘reduce’ to the hearer’s track- record. Seen this way, the ‘reductionist’ rejects the 
common- sense idea that the hearer gets what she needs for knowledge from the 
speaker, and thus rejects testimonial knowledge as involving knowledge transfer 
of either knowledge or justifi cation from the speaker. Th is ‘reductionist’ view is 
then easy to dismiss with Gettier counterexamples. Lackey (2008: 142– 59) does 
so. Imagine that the speaker is right just by luck, but that the hearer has a pretty 
good track- record of evidence to justify reliance. Th en intuitively the hearer, too, 
despite the track- record, has a Gettierized justifi ed true belief. Th e hearer’s track- 
record is then not enough to convert a true belief into knowledge. Lackey argues 
that a further, anti- Gettier, condition is required, involving the reliability of the 
speaker’s testimony. Paralleling her formulation of reductionism, she formulates 
‘non- ’reductionism as the view that a true testimony- based belief, provided that the 
hearer has no defeaters, is knowledge. Th is view also suff ers the same fate: Gettier 
counterexamples are easy to formulate. She concludes that both reductionism 
(about knowledge) and anti- reductionism (about knowledge) are wrong, for the 
same reason. She then formulates a ‘hybrid’ theory, neither ‘reductionist’ nor 
‘non- reductionist’, for testimonial knowledge. (By these lights, any theory that 
sees the speaker as playing some role in meeting the anti- luck condition is a 
9781474258791_pi-288.indd   129 18-Apr-18   1:19:07 PM
130 Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy
‘hybrid’ theory – which includes nearly everyone working on the topic, including 
our common- sense view that the hearer’s knowledge depends on the speaker’s 
knowledge.) Putting all of this to one side, Lackey ends up advancing a reductionist 
account of testimonial  justifi cation (she would call this the ‘rationality dimension’ 
of justifi cation), for she adopts a ‘positive reasons requirement’ on testimonial 
knowledge, where ‘for each report R, the positive reasons justifying R cannot 
ultimately be testimonially grounded, where this means that the justifi catory or 
epistemic chain leading up to R cannot “bottom out” in testimony’ (186). Although 
Lackey spends some time in her book arguing that adults have plenty of positive 
reasons supporting testimony, she spends little time addressing whether adults 
satisfy this reductive requirement, which is just the requirement at issue. 
 10  For other arguments, see Coady ( 1992 ) and Rysiew ( 2007 ). For some discussion of 
these arguments, see Fricker ( 1995 ) and Graham ( 2000c ). 
 11  For detractors, see Lyons ( 1997 ), Shogenji ( 2006 ), van Cleve ( 2006 ), Lackey (2008), 
and Kenyon ( 2013 ). Fricker (1995, forthcoming a) is well known for the distinction 
between ‘local’ and ‘global’ reductionism. She grants that testimonial justifi cation 
does not ‘globally’ reduce (individuals do not possess a reductive justifi cation for 
the proposition that testimony is generally reliable), but she insists that it ‘locally’ 
reduces (individuals possess reductive justifi cation for propositions of the form that 
this speaker on this occasion is trustworthy on this topic). Many commentators, 
including myself, doubt that this move succeeds, for they doubt that individuals 
possess adequate  reductive local justifi cations, never mind adequate reductive 
global justifi cations. See Insole ( 2000 ), Gelfert ( 2009 ), and Graham ( 2016a ). 
 12  Selective trust in special cases some of the time is one thing; reductive trust in 
every case is another altogether. I discuss this argument in considerable detail 
elsewhere (2016a). 
 13  See Graham ( 2016a , sec. 5) for a review of the literature and references. See also 
Harris ( 2012 ), Cole, Harris, and Koenig ( 2012 ), and Harris and Lane ( 2014 ). 
 14  Paul Faulkner ( 2011 ) claims to occupy a middle ground. He argues that the anti- 
reductionist is wrong – we don’t enjoy a prima facie default right to testimony – but 
the reductionist is wrong, too – we don’t need a reductive justifi cation showing 
that testimony in general, or in the particular ‘local’ case, is reliable. Because of 
the ‘problem of communication’ – because hearers want the truth, but because 
speakers, as rational self- interested agents, want the freedom to lie when that 
serves their interests – hearers need a reason in each and every case (even small 
children) to justifi ably believe the speaker’s report; it would be epistemically 
irrational otherwise to believe testimony without such a reason. But if the reason 
is not a reductive argument showing the reliability of the speaker, what is it? Th e 
reason is the hearer’s aff ective trust that the speaker will prove trustworthy, where 
that is the normative expectation that the speaker should prove trustworthy, for 
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the speaker and the hearer are both subject to, and have internalized, the social 
norm of trustworthiness (of truth telling). (More on social norms in the fi nal 
section.) Th e speaker, then aware of the hearer’s normative expectation, will prove 
trustworthy (will fulfi l the expectation). Th e hearer then possesses a mini- argument 
rationalizing acceptance of the speaker’s assertion: (1) I normatively expect truth 
telling; (2) the speaker knows this; (3) the speaker has also internalized the norm, 
and so will prove trustworthy; (4) so, the speaker is telling the truth; (5) so, it is 
rational to believe the speaker’s assertion. Although I agree with Faulkner about 
the important role that social norms play in the overall epistemology of testimony, 
I do not agree they tell the whole story: they are one mechanism among others 
underwriting the reliability of testimony, not the only one. (More on this in the 
fi nal section.) Also, I think that he has confl ated two issues. One issue is that of 
whether hearers need to represent, in their psychology, a rationalizing argument 
justifying their reliance. Another issue is that of whether there is a problem of 
communication, whether the possibility of deceit shows that the anti- reductionist 
cannot be right. Once social norms of truth- telling enter the picture, the problem 
of communication goes away. So, the case against the anti- reductionist dissolves. 
Why then think that everyone (even small children), in each and every case, 
needs a mini- argument to rationalize trust? Well, if you were an internalist with a 
tendency to intellectualize (some would say hyper- intellectualize) the epistemology 
of testimony, then you’d go for that conclusion. But since I don’t, I won’t. Faulkner 
thinks that the problem of cooperation motivates an internalist result, but it is 
(I believe) his internalist convictions that are doing the work, not the problem 
of cooperation. Th e structural problem of communication is one thing; the case 
for internalism is another. For discussion of Faulkner in more detail, see Graham 
( 2012 ,  2013 ). 
 15  Here is another: ASTROLOGIST. Mary sometimes believes that it is raining 
in her village because she pulls the drapes and looks outside, and sometimes 
because she consults an astrological table with the drapes closed. Today, Mary 
looks outside and sees that it is raining. But when she takes your phone call and 
tells you that it is raining, you do not come to know that it is, for she would just 
as easily tell you that it is raining when it is not. Relying on her testimony about 
the weather, you would easily be mistaken (Peacocke 1986). For discussion of the 
issue and additional counterexamples, see Graham ( 2000a ,  2016b ) and Lackey 
(2008). 
 16  Th e diff erence between FOSSIL and Lackey’s (1999, 2008) SCHOOLTEACHER 
example is that FOSSIL involves testimonial knowledge of a proposition that no 
one has ever previously known. In Lackey’s example, the schoolteacher is passing 
on knowledge of evolutionary theory, well- known throughout the science. FOSSIL 
seems to illustrate the possibility that testimony can ‘generate’ knowledge, namely, 
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be the very fi rst source of a new piece of knowledge, something that typically only 
occurs in perception, introspection, a priori understanding, and reasoning from 
those three sources. Th ose who think that testimony cannot ‘generate’ knowledge 
allow such cases like Lackey’s (they only insist on knowledge in the chain of 
sources), hence the need to create a case that avoids the qualifi cation. For further 
discussion of these and related cases, see Audi ( 2006 ), Fricker ( 2006 ,  2015 ,  2016 ), 
Graham ( 2006a ,  2016b ), Faulkner ( 2010 ), Burge ( 2013 ), Carter and Nickel ( 2014 ), 
Wright ( 2016 ), and Bachman and Graham (forthcoming). 
 17  ‘Basis’ safety is not to be confused with ‘belief ’ safety. A basis is safe just in case 
it leads you to a true belief in the actual world and doesn’t lead you astray in any 
nearby possible world. A belief is safe just in case it is true in the actual world and 
true in all nearby worlds. Th e standard example to illustrate this diff erence involves 
fl ipping a coin to form the belief that 14 + 23 = 37. If you believe because you 
fl ipped a coin, then you didn’t believe on a safe basis. In a nearby world the coin fl ip 
will come up the other way, and you’ll end up believing a falsehood. But the belief 
that 14 + 23 = 37 (on the other hand) is true in all nearby worlds where you believe 
it, because it is true in any world where you believe it, because (as a necessary 
truth) it is true in all worlds! Forming a belief on a coin fl ip is not a safe basis, but 
the belief in the mathematical proposition is a safe belief. Th e safety account of 
knowledge is a safe- basis account, not a safe- belief account: there are safe beliefs 
that fail to measure up to knowledge, but no belief is knowledge without being held 
on a safe basis. 
 18  Mary in ASTROLOGY works the same way. By looking out the window through 
the drapes, Mary forms the belief, on a safe basis, that it is raining outside. Th at’s 
why she knows that it is raining. But when she tells you that it is raining, you do not 
form a belief on a safe basis. She would easily tell you that it is raining outside when 
it is not; relying on her testimony about the weather would then easily lead you 
astray. Th at’s why you don’t acquire knowledge from her, even though she knows it 
is raining today. 
 19  For more discussion, detail, and defence of – and further references for – the safe- 
basis account of testimonial knowledge, see Graham ( 2016b ). 
 20  For additional arguments for a further broadening of the epistemology of 
testimony, see Graham ( 2000a ,  2015a ,  2016b ). 
 21  Among our social practices – our shared patterns of behaviour – there are many 
kinds: customs, descriptive norms, conventions, and social norms. Th us, it is not 
trivially true that some of our epistemic norms are social norms (or habits, or 
customs), just because we have a social practice of asking for and giving reasons. 
For that practice might be a custom, a descriptive norm, a convention, or a social 
norm. Th e case must be made. 
 22  For a longer discussion of some of these issues, see Graham ( 2015b ). For critical 
engagement, see Fricker (forthcoming a). For more exploration of Bicchieri’s 
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framework for epistemic norms as social norms, see Henderson and Graham 
(forthcoming a,b). Faulkner’s (2010, 2011) work is clearly relevant here, too (as 
discussed previously). Th e social norms account is an important alternative to both 
the constitutive norms account of the epistemology of testimony (e.g. see Goldberg 
[2015]; for critical discussion, see Johnson [2015]) and the assurance view, for each 
is sensitive to the normative dimension of testimony, but each locates it in other 
kinds of normativity, kinds that do not directly address the motivational basis for 
the reliability of testimony. 
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